Friday, July 11, 2003
George Bush is a weapon of mass destruction.
This has been fun today, when the clouds lifted a bit, and, quoting someone in comments at the Daily Kos, we get to hear the loud yawn of a public waking up from a deep slumber.
All fingers in the Bush administration seem to be pointing at the CIA, blaming the CIA for not objecting to the Niger line in the state of the union speech. The Bushies are hoping the public will buy this pathetic explanation for their lies, distortions and war.
Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, weighed in just a few moments ago when he released a statement calling the CIA intelligence leading up to the war "sloppy". He also accused the CIA of deliberately leaking reports in order to discredit the president.
I never in a million years thought I would be defending the CIA, but I'm not going to wax sentimental for my contempt of this agency, and urge everyone to email Senator Pat Roberts in protest of his and the Bush and company's attempts to pass this stinker off to the CIA, and specifically, George Tenet. Tell Pat I said "Hi".
All fingers in the Bush administration seem to be pointing at the CIA, blaming the CIA for not objecting to the Niger line in the state of the union speech. The Bushies are hoping the public will buy this pathetic explanation for their lies, distortions and war.
Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, weighed in just a few moments ago when he released a statement calling the CIA intelligence leading up to the war "sloppy". He also accused the CIA of deliberately leaking reports in order to discredit the president.
I never in a million years thought I would be defending the CIA, but I'm not going to wax sentimental for my contempt of this agency, and urge everyone to email Senator Pat Roberts in protest of his and the Bush and company's attempts to pass this stinker off to the CIA, and specifically, George Tenet. Tell Pat I said "Hi".
# posted by scorpiorising : 2:37 PM |
Thursday, July 10, 2003
Introducing Ishtar Talking
Where is Raed introduces a female Iraqi blogger living in Basra. She passionately talks of her love/hate feelings for her own country:
In the presence of that mountain sized despair, which has already burdened my weary heart with the frustrations of all the past years to wait for me now and rip me apart to pieces which are hard to bring back together. I am going to declare what has been gnawing on me brutally from the inside so hard I can't even think about blaming myself for keeping this inside for so long. I will confess that I despise you.
Yes, I blame you for creating all these rifts within me, I hate you as much our people have suffered, as much as my ears had to listen to the sounds of bombs and missiles, I hate you as much as the destruction my eyes has seen, as much as I hate the blood that flowed, the wasted years and the loss of my hopes for a future. I hate you as much as all the Iraqis who had to immigrate, as much as the politicians who had to disappear. I blame you for the suffering through the merciless humid and hot nights of Basra without the simplest creature comforts, I blame you for not being able to find the simplest entertainment in my city the second biggest city in Iraq, blame you for the dirt road I have to travel to get to my university which is right in the middle of the city. Blame you for loosing the will to live and for my need for love which was lost in you……..
Because of all that, my dearest Iraq, I despise you. But please, my love and hate, understand my anger. I want you to stop answering my questions about the wasted childhood and youth by saying that these things will be forgotten, because if you do that again you will have to allow me to keep on despising you.
In the presence of that mountain sized despair, which has already burdened my weary heart with the frustrations of all the past years to wait for me now and rip me apart to pieces which are hard to bring back together. I am going to declare what has been gnawing on me brutally from the inside so hard I can't even think about blaming myself for keeping this inside for so long. I will confess that I despise you.
Yes, I blame you for creating all these rifts within me, I hate you as much our people have suffered, as much as my ears had to listen to the sounds of bombs and missiles, I hate you as much as the destruction my eyes has seen, as much as I hate the blood that flowed, the wasted years and the loss of my hopes for a future. I hate you as much as all the Iraqis who had to immigrate, as much as the politicians who had to disappear. I blame you for the suffering through the merciless humid and hot nights of Basra without the simplest creature comforts, I blame you for not being able to find the simplest entertainment in my city the second biggest city in Iraq, blame you for the dirt road I have to travel to get to my university which is right in the middle of the city. Blame you for loosing the will to live and for my need for love which was lost in you……..
Because of all that, my dearest Iraq, I despise you. But please, my love and hate, understand my anger. I want you to stop answering my questions about the wasted childhood and youth by saying that these things will be forgotten, because if you do that again you will have to allow me to keep on despising you.
# posted by scorpiorising : 11:59 AM |
The Brits in Basra and blood money.
The Baghdad blogger, Where is Raed now writes a column for the Guardian, and from his report, it looks like the Brits have done a much better job in Basra, than the Americans in Baghdad. Maybe if we turned over the entire country to the Brits, (and kick out Halliburton in the process)...
The flip side of this decision is the way the British have dealt with the issue of Iraqis killed by the British forces by mistake. The south is very tribal. Killing someone, especially if he came from a powerful tribe, might start a chain of revenge killings unless the two tribes were to agree on some sort of compensation, ie blood money. So while we are sitting with some people in Amarah we hear the following story.
During a wedding celebration, two young men fire celebratory shots into the air. A British patrol happens to be near by, they think they have a couple of Fedayeen shooting at them. Bang bang, the Iraqis are dead.
The British take the bodies to the hospital, and after conducting an investigation they find out they were not Fedayeen, a mistake has been made. So the next day two British officers, two Iraqi lawyers and a translator go to the hospital and ask how the locals deal with this sort of thing. The concept of "Fasil" or blood money is explained to them. A couple of days later the word spreads that the British have paid 15 million Iraqi dinars in blood money to the families of the two Iraqi men. Further bloodshed was stopped. Perfect.
The flip side of this decision is the way the British have dealt with the issue of Iraqis killed by the British forces by mistake. The south is very tribal. Killing someone, especially if he came from a powerful tribe, might start a chain of revenge killings unless the two tribes were to agree on some sort of compensation, ie blood money. So while we are sitting with some people in Amarah we hear the following story.
During a wedding celebration, two young men fire celebratory shots into the air. A British patrol happens to be near by, they think they have a couple of Fedayeen shooting at them. Bang bang, the Iraqis are dead.
The British take the bodies to the hospital, and after conducting an investigation they find out they were not Fedayeen, a mistake has been made. So the next day two British officers, two Iraqi lawyers and a translator go to the hospital and ask how the locals deal with this sort of thing. The concept of "Fasil" or blood money is explained to them. A couple of days later the word spreads that the British have paid 15 million Iraqi dinars in blood money to the families of the two Iraqi men. Further bloodshed was stopped. Perfect.
# posted by scorpiorising : 11:19 AM |
Gettin' down and dirty.
I don't mind the idea of a candidate directly challenging the ideas of another, without getting dirty and personal, but you have to wonder about the over-all health of the candidacy of John Kerry, when he has apparently decided to focus on finding the dirt on Dean.
Dean was governor of Vermont for 11 years. If there was real dirt on him, it would more than likely be out by now folks. Okay, maybe there is some dirt that hasn't been dug up.
It was my understanding that the democratic candidates made some kind of pledge to refrain from attacking each other. In my view, its gone a little too far, with no one challenging the views and beliefs of the other, which makes for a rather dull campaign and little media attention. It is through healthy conflict that the candidates can potentially distinguish themselves from each other.
The way that the strategy of cooperation has worked is that democrats and their constituents appear united as never before in the common goal of regime change. We need this. What we don't need is for the candidates to go in search of personal dirt on each other.
Dean has a record of distinguished service in Vermont. You may not agree with his philosophy, or his political choices, but there were no scandals. If Kerry is going in search of scandals, he may create one himself.
Edwin Edwards, the ex-governor of Louisiana now in prison, used to say,
"The only way my political enemies can defeat me, is if they find me in bed with a dead girl or a live boy." Edwards wound up being convicted of extortion, basically. Barring any discoveries of this nature, it is difficult to see what will be accomplished with the dirt digging strategy, except the angering and alienation of Dean's supporters.
Let me bring it down to the micro level. Here in Louisiana, I am attempting to organize voter registration drives utilizing volunteers from the campaigns of the candidates. I am making my contacts through the meet-ups of each candidate. I am wondering how Dean supporters are going to react to the news that Kerry is searching for dirt on their candidate. I am also wondering if Kerry's hostility to Dean is going to trickle down to the well-attended Kerry meet-ups here. Will Kerry volunteers be willing to cooperate with Dean volunteers if they perceive that the "new" strategy is one of personal attack?
One has to wonder if there isn't a paucity of ideas right now in the Kerry camp, for such a strategy to be decided on. Wouldn't it be more constructive to find a way to better promote the ideas of Kerry in order to reach more people, which is, by the way, what Dean has managed to accomplish in his campaign?
Unfortunately, attack politics has worked all too well in American history, but this strategy has succeeded in denigrating the message. Does Kerry really want this political climate to continue, in which voters decide not on the basis of the merit of ideas, but rather on the dirt that manages to stain the man or woman running for political office? The choice is his, and ours:
THE HOWARD DEAN PROJECT
The presidential campaign of Sen. John Kerry may be saying that it doesn't care about the new momentum of Howie Dean's team, but it sure isn't acting like it. Kerry's folks have begun intensive opposition research on Dean, sending staff to Vermont to pull together whatever dirt they can find out about not only Dean but also his wife, who continues to work as a physician in the state.
"It's early, but not too early to start taking him down a notch," says a Kerry staffer. "We've gone head to head with Dean in debates, we've tried to shout them down and shut them up, and they are still hanging around. We're going on the offensive."
From the beginning, perhaps because Kerry was a fellow Northeastern Democrat, Dean seemed to focus his attacks on the senator from Massachusetts. The two candidates have gone at each other throats in debates and candidate forums around the country, and Dean has jabbed at Kerry from the podium. Now Dean has apparently outraised Kerry and his huge fundraising operation in the second quarter of this fiscal year.
Kerry's oppo staff appears to be focusing on Dean's career as a practicing physician, which the candidate has spoken about on the stump. Dean has claimed that he assisted underaged women who were pregnant, but has declined to say whether he provided them with abortions. Dean has also attempted to side-step his deferment from the military during the Vietnam War. Dean claims it was for a congenital back problem. But after receiving his free pass out of service, he spent several months skiing in Colorado, and has bragged about it.
The Kerry staffer says that Dean's recent appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press" gave them pause. "He was avoiding having to talk about anything substantive from his background. There has to be stuff there. We're looking. If he's going to be around for the long haul, we might as well be ready."
Dean was governor of Vermont for 11 years. If there was real dirt on him, it would more than likely be out by now folks. Okay, maybe there is some dirt that hasn't been dug up.
It was my understanding that the democratic candidates made some kind of pledge to refrain from attacking each other. In my view, its gone a little too far, with no one challenging the views and beliefs of the other, which makes for a rather dull campaign and little media attention. It is through healthy conflict that the candidates can potentially distinguish themselves from each other.
The way that the strategy of cooperation has worked is that democrats and their constituents appear united as never before in the common goal of regime change. We need this. What we don't need is for the candidates to go in search of personal dirt on each other.
Dean has a record of distinguished service in Vermont. You may not agree with his philosophy, or his political choices, but there were no scandals. If Kerry is going in search of scandals, he may create one himself.
Edwin Edwards, the ex-governor of Louisiana now in prison, used to say,
"The only way my political enemies can defeat me, is if they find me in bed with a dead girl or a live boy." Edwards wound up being convicted of extortion, basically. Barring any discoveries of this nature, it is difficult to see what will be accomplished with the dirt digging strategy, except the angering and alienation of Dean's supporters.
Let me bring it down to the micro level. Here in Louisiana, I am attempting to organize voter registration drives utilizing volunteers from the campaigns of the candidates. I am making my contacts through the meet-ups of each candidate. I am wondering how Dean supporters are going to react to the news that Kerry is searching for dirt on their candidate. I am also wondering if Kerry's hostility to Dean is going to trickle down to the well-attended Kerry meet-ups here. Will Kerry volunteers be willing to cooperate with Dean volunteers if they perceive that the "new" strategy is one of personal attack?
One has to wonder if there isn't a paucity of ideas right now in the Kerry camp, for such a strategy to be decided on. Wouldn't it be more constructive to find a way to better promote the ideas of Kerry in order to reach more people, which is, by the way, what Dean has managed to accomplish in his campaign?
Unfortunately, attack politics has worked all too well in American history, but this strategy has succeeded in denigrating the message. Does Kerry really want this political climate to continue, in which voters decide not on the basis of the merit of ideas, but rather on the dirt that manages to stain the man or woman running for political office? The choice is his, and ours:
THE HOWARD DEAN PROJECT
The presidential campaign of Sen. John Kerry may be saying that it doesn't care about the new momentum of Howie Dean's team, but it sure isn't acting like it. Kerry's folks have begun intensive opposition research on Dean, sending staff to Vermont to pull together whatever dirt they can find out about not only Dean but also his wife, who continues to work as a physician in the state.
"It's early, but not too early to start taking him down a notch," says a Kerry staffer. "We've gone head to head with Dean in debates, we've tried to shout them down and shut them up, and they are still hanging around. We're going on the offensive."
From the beginning, perhaps because Kerry was a fellow Northeastern Democrat, Dean seemed to focus his attacks on the senator from Massachusetts. The two candidates have gone at each other throats in debates and candidate forums around the country, and Dean has jabbed at Kerry from the podium. Now Dean has apparently outraised Kerry and his huge fundraising operation in the second quarter of this fiscal year.
Kerry's oppo staff appears to be focusing on Dean's career as a practicing physician, which the candidate has spoken about on the stump. Dean has claimed that he assisted underaged women who were pregnant, but has declined to say whether he provided them with abortions. Dean has also attempted to side-step his deferment from the military during the Vietnam War. Dean claims it was for a congenital back problem. But after receiving his free pass out of service, he spent several months skiing in Colorado, and has bragged about it.
The Kerry staffer says that Dean's recent appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press" gave them pause. "He was avoiding having to talk about anything substantive from his background. There has to be stuff there. We're looking. If he's going to be around for the long haul, we might as well be ready."
# posted by scorpiorising : 7:55 AM |
Tuesday, July 08, 2003
Ari Fleischer refuses to stand by his man, the White House backs off of the claims regarding Iraq's nuclear program and says Bush should not have used the documents in his State of the Union speech. All of this triggered by yesterday's report issued by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, in which it was questioned why this debunked intelligence was used, when it was already disproved by the CIA:
WASHINGTON, July 7 — The White House acknowledged for the first time today that President Bush was relying on incomplete and perhaps inaccurate information from American intelligence agencies when he declared, in his State of the Union speech, that Saddam Hussein had tried to purchase uranium from Africa.
The White House statement appeared to undercut one of the key pieces of evidence that President Bush and his aides had cited to back their claims made prior to launching an attack against Iraq in March that Mr. Hussein was "reconstituting" his nuclear weapons program. Those claims added urgency to the White House case that military action to depose Mr. Hussein needed to be taken quickly, and could not await further inspections of the country or additional resolutions at the United Nations.
The acknowledgment came after a day of questions — and sometimes contradictory answers from White House officials — about an article published on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times on Sunday by Joseph C. Wilson 4th, a former ambassador who was sent to Niger, in West Africa, last year to investigate reports of the attempted purchase. He reported back that the intelligence was likely fraudulent, a warning that White House officials say never reached them.
"There is other reporting to suggest that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Africa," the statement said. "However, the information is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that attempts were in fact made."
In other words, said one senior official, "we couldn't prove it, and it might in fact be wrong."
Separately tonight, The Washington Post quoted an unidentifed senior administration official as declaring that "knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech." Some administration officials have expressed similar sentiments in interviews in the past two weeks.
Asked about the statement early today, before President Bush departed for a six-day tour of Africa, Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said, "There is zero, nada, nothing new here." He said that "we've long acknowledged" that information on the attempted purchases from Niger "did, indeed, turn out to be incorrect."
But in public, administration officials have defended the president's statement in the State of Union address that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
While Mr. Bush cited the British report, seemingly giving the account the credibility of coming from a non-American intelligence service, Britain itself relied in part on information provided by the C.I.A., American and British officials have said.
But today a report from a parliamentary committee that conducted an investigation into the British assertions also questioned the credibility of what the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair had published.
The committee went on to say that Mr. Blair's government had asserted it had other evidence of Iraqi attempts to procure uranium. But eight months later the government still had not told Parliament what that other information was.
While Mr. Bush quoted the British report, his statement was apparently primarily based on American intelligence — a classified "National Intelligence Estimate" published in October of last year that also identified two other countries, Congo and Somalia, where Iraq had sought the material, in addition to Niger.
But many analysts did not believe those reports at the time, and were shocked to hear the president make such a flat, declarative statement.
Asked about the accuracy of the president's statement this morning, Mr. Fleischer said, "We see nothing that would dissuade us from the president's broader statement." But when pressed, he said he would clarify the issue later today.
Tonight, after Air Force One had departed, White House officials issued a statement in Mr. Fleischer's name that made clear that they no longer stood behind Mr. Bush's statement.
How Mr. Bush's statement made it into last January's State of the Union address is still unclear. No one involved in drafting the speech will say who put the phrase in, or whether it was drawn from the classified intelligence estimate.
That document contained a footnote — in a separate section of the report, on another subject — noting that State Department experts were doubtful of the claims that Mr. Hussein had sought uranium.
If the intelligence was true, it would have buttressed statements by Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney that Saddam Hussein was actively seeking a nuclear weapon, and could build one in a year or less if he obtained enough nuclear material.
In early March, before the invasion of Iraq began, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismissed the uranium reports about Niger, noting that they were based on forged documents.
In an interview late last month, a senior administration official said that the news of the fraud was not brought to the attention of the White House until after Mr. Bush had spoken.
But even then, White House officials made no effort to correct the president's remarks. Indeed, as recently as a few weeks ago they were arguing that Mr. Bush had quite deliberately avoided mentioning Niger, and noted that he had spoken more generally about efforts to obtain "yellowcake," the substance from which uranium is extracted, from African nations.
Tonight's statement, though, calls even those reports into question. In interviews in recent days, a number of administration officials have conceded that Mr. Bush never should have made the claims, given the weakness of the case. One senior official said that the uranium purchases were "only one small part" of a broader effort to reconstitute the nuclear program, and that Mr. Bush probably should have dwelled on others.
White House officials would not say, however, how the statement was approved. They have suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency approved the wording, though the C.I.A. has said none of its senior leaders had reviewed it. Other key members of the administration said the information was discounted early on, and that by the time the president delivered the State of the Union address, there were widespread questions about the quality of the intelligence.
"We only found that out later," said one official involved in the speech.
WASHINGTON, July 7 — The White House acknowledged for the first time today that President Bush was relying on incomplete and perhaps inaccurate information from American intelligence agencies when he declared, in his State of the Union speech, that Saddam Hussein had tried to purchase uranium from Africa.
The White House statement appeared to undercut one of the key pieces of evidence that President Bush and his aides had cited to back their claims made prior to launching an attack against Iraq in March that Mr. Hussein was "reconstituting" his nuclear weapons program. Those claims added urgency to the White House case that military action to depose Mr. Hussein needed to be taken quickly, and could not await further inspections of the country or additional resolutions at the United Nations.
The acknowledgment came after a day of questions — and sometimes contradictory answers from White House officials — about an article published on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times on Sunday by Joseph C. Wilson 4th, a former ambassador who was sent to Niger, in West Africa, last year to investigate reports of the attempted purchase. He reported back that the intelligence was likely fraudulent, a warning that White House officials say never reached them.
"There is other reporting to suggest that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Africa," the statement said. "However, the information is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that attempts were in fact made."
In other words, said one senior official, "we couldn't prove it, and it might in fact be wrong."
Separately tonight, The Washington Post quoted an unidentifed senior administration official as declaring that "knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech." Some administration officials have expressed similar sentiments in interviews in the past two weeks.
Asked about the statement early today, before President Bush departed for a six-day tour of Africa, Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said, "There is zero, nada, nothing new here." He said that "we've long acknowledged" that information on the attempted purchases from Niger "did, indeed, turn out to be incorrect."
But in public, administration officials have defended the president's statement in the State of Union address that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
While Mr. Bush cited the British report, seemingly giving the account the credibility of coming from a non-American intelligence service, Britain itself relied in part on information provided by the C.I.A., American and British officials have said.
But today a report from a parliamentary committee that conducted an investigation into the British assertions also questioned the credibility of what the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair had published.
The committee went on to say that Mr. Blair's government had asserted it had other evidence of Iraqi attempts to procure uranium. But eight months later the government still had not told Parliament what that other information was.
While Mr. Bush quoted the British report, his statement was apparently primarily based on American intelligence — a classified "National Intelligence Estimate" published in October of last year that also identified two other countries, Congo and Somalia, where Iraq had sought the material, in addition to Niger.
But many analysts did not believe those reports at the time, and were shocked to hear the president make such a flat, declarative statement.
Asked about the accuracy of the president's statement this morning, Mr. Fleischer said, "We see nothing that would dissuade us from the president's broader statement." But when pressed, he said he would clarify the issue later today.
Tonight, after Air Force One had departed, White House officials issued a statement in Mr. Fleischer's name that made clear that they no longer stood behind Mr. Bush's statement.
How Mr. Bush's statement made it into last January's State of the Union address is still unclear. No one involved in drafting the speech will say who put the phrase in, or whether it was drawn from the classified intelligence estimate.
That document contained a footnote — in a separate section of the report, on another subject — noting that State Department experts were doubtful of the claims that Mr. Hussein had sought uranium.
If the intelligence was true, it would have buttressed statements by Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney that Saddam Hussein was actively seeking a nuclear weapon, and could build one in a year or less if he obtained enough nuclear material.
In early March, before the invasion of Iraq began, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismissed the uranium reports about Niger, noting that they were based on forged documents.
In an interview late last month, a senior administration official said that the news of the fraud was not brought to the attention of the White House until after Mr. Bush had spoken.
But even then, White House officials made no effort to correct the president's remarks. Indeed, as recently as a few weeks ago they were arguing that Mr. Bush had quite deliberately avoided mentioning Niger, and noted that he had spoken more generally about efforts to obtain "yellowcake," the substance from which uranium is extracted, from African nations.
Tonight's statement, though, calls even those reports into question. In interviews in recent days, a number of administration officials have conceded that Mr. Bush never should have made the claims, given the weakness of the case. One senior official said that the uranium purchases were "only one small part" of a broader effort to reconstitute the nuclear program, and that Mr. Bush probably should have dwelled on others.
White House officials would not say, however, how the statement was approved. They have suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency approved the wording, though the C.I.A. has said none of its senior leaders had reviewed it. Other key members of the administration said the information was discounted early on, and that by the time the president delivered the State of the Union address, there were widespread questions about the quality of the intelligence.
"We only found that out later," said one official involved in the speech.
# posted by scorpiorising : 5:40 AM |
Monday, July 07, 2003
Ending notes.
Tompaine.commonsense has an excellent article on the need for a liberal media.
Arms and the Man (who's making a killing on killing in Iraq) has a link to a Washington Post story on the rather strange and portent appointment of a Republican operative to a position in post-war Iraq.
Arms and the Man (who's making a killing on killing in Iraq) has a link to a Washington Post story on the rather strange and portent appointment of a Republican operative to a position in post-war Iraq.
# posted by scorpiorising : 5:29 PM |
Thanks to the Daily Howler for this link to a Washington Post article concerning the findings of a CIA internal review panel on wmd's in Iraq. The 4-person panel was headed by Richard J. Kerr, a former CIA deputy director.
From the report, we glean that the CIA was relying on intelligence gathered before 1998, the year the weapons inspectors were kicked out of Iraq. Apparently, the CIA assumed Iraq was continuing the development of wmds, based on purchases made by the country (what purchases and when???).
Kerr must be from a different planet where different rules of logic are used, because he concludes that "the analysts were pretty much on the mark." Is he talking about the same country that we've all been talking about, where no trace of wmds have been found, no smoking guns, no barrels of chemical and vials of biological weapons?
U.S. intelligence analysts lacked new, hard information about Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons after United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998, and so had to rely on data from the early and mid-1990s when they concluded in months leading up to the war that those programs continued into 2003, according to preliminary findings of a CIA internal review panel.
Although the post-1998 evidence was largely circumstantial or "inferential" because of the inspectors' absence and the lack of reliable agents inside Iraq, the panel said yesterday, the judgment that Hussein continued to have weapons of mass destruction appears justified.
"It would have been very hard to conclude those programs were not continuing, based on the reports being gathered in recent years about Iraqi purchases and other activities before the war," said Richard J. Kerr, a former CIA deputy director who heads the four-person review panel appointed in February by CIA Director George J. Tenet. The panel's mission, initially suggested by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, is to provide "lessons learned" from the Iraq war by comparing the prewar analyses and estimates to the intelligence gathered inside the country after the war.
Kerr said the prewar intelligence reports given to Bush administration policymakers from the CIA, the Pentagon and State Department contained caveats and disagreements on data underlying some judgments, such as whether Hussein's nuclear program was being reconstituted. But "on the whole, the analysts were pretty much on the mark," he said.
Kerr offered no evidence that analysts were pressured to conform to the administrations wishes in creating justification for this war.
In my view, this report is a crock. Having an ex-deputy director investigate the body he use to head is as good as having the CIA investigate itself. There are preconceived notions and beliefs that Kerr took with him in this "investigation". This report proves nothing, except something we already knew: Tenet does not really want the truth revealed, because his goose would be cooked.
From the report, we glean that the CIA was relying on intelligence gathered before 1998, the year the weapons inspectors were kicked out of Iraq. Apparently, the CIA assumed Iraq was continuing the development of wmds, based on purchases made by the country (what purchases and when???).
Kerr must be from a different planet where different rules of logic are used, because he concludes that "the analysts were pretty much on the mark." Is he talking about the same country that we've all been talking about, where no trace of wmds have been found, no smoking guns, no barrels of chemical and vials of biological weapons?
U.S. intelligence analysts lacked new, hard information about Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons after United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998, and so had to rely on data from the early and mid-1990s when they concluded in months leading up to the war that those programs continued into 2003, according to preliminary findings of a CIA internal review panel.
Although the post-1998 evidence was largely circumstantial or "inferential" because of the inspectors' absence and the lack of reliable agents inside Iraq, the panel said yesterday, the judgment that Hussein continued to have weapons of mass destruction appears justified.
"It would have been very hard to conclude those programs were not continuing, based on the reports being gathered in recent years about Iraqi purchases and other activities before the war," said Richard J. Kerr, a former CIA deputy director who heads the four-person review panel appointed in February by CIA Director George J. Tenet. The panel's mission, initially suggested by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, is to provide "lessons learned" from the Iraq war by comparing the prewar analyses and estimates to the intelligence gathered inside the country after the war.
Kerr said the prewar intelligence reports given to Bush administration policymakers from the CIA, the Pentagon and State Department contained caveats and disagreements on data underlying some judgments, such as whether Hussein's nuclear program was being reconstituted. But "on the whole, the analysts were pretty much on the mark," he said.
Kerr offered no evidence that analysts were pressured to conform to the administrations wishes in creating justification for this war.
In my view, this report is a crock. Having an ex-deputy director investigate the body he use to head is as good as having the CIA investigate itself. There are preconceived notions and beliefs that Kerr took with him in this "investigation". This report proves nothing, except something we already knew: Tenet does not really want the truth revealed, because his goose would be cooked.
# posted by scorpiorising : 1:46 PM |
Cheney loved to visit the CIA.
Ray McGovern, ex-CIA analyst, talks about Cheney's many visits to the CIA before the war began:
Cheney got into the operational side of intelligence as well. Reports in late 2001 that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium from Niger stirred such intense interest that his office let it be known he wanted them checked out. So, with the CIA as facilitator, a retired U.S. ambassador was dispatched to Niger in February 2002 to investigate. He found nothing to substantiate the report and lots to call it into question. There the matter rested--until last summer, after the Bush administration made the decision for war in Iraq.
Cheney, in a speech on Aug. 26, 2002, claimed that Saddam Hussein had "resumed his effort to acquire nuclear weapons."
At the time, CIA analysts were involved in a knock-down, drag-out argument with the Pentagon on this very point. Most of the nuclear engineers at the CIA, and virtually all scientists at U.S. government laboratories and the International Atomic Energy Agency, found no reliable evidence that Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons program.
Cheney got into the operational side of intelligence as well. Reports in late 2001 that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium from Niger stirred such intense interest that his office let it be known he wanted them checked out. So, with the CIA as facilitator, a retired U.S. ambassador was dispatched to Niger in February 2002 to investigate. He found nothing to substantiate the report and lots to call it into question. There the matter rested--until last summer, after the Bush administration made the decision for war in Iraq.
Cheney, in a speech on Aug. 26, 2002, claimed that Saddam Hussein had "resumed his effort to acquire nuclear weapons."
At the time, CIA analysts were involved in a knock-down, drag-out argument with the Pentagon on this very point. Most of the nuclear engineers at the CIA, and virtually all scientists at U.S. government laboratories and the International Atomic Energy Agency, found no reliable evidence that Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons program.
# posted by scorpiorising : 1:31 PM |
Conclusions, conclusions, conclusions...
There are many conclusions in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report released today, and these conlcusions seem based on the kind of fragile and faulty reasoning and intelligence that lead us into this war to begin with.
For example, the committee concluded that Britain relied too heavily on U.S. intelligence, including that of exiles and defectors with an "agenda of their own". Yet it is also concluded that the perception of the threat posed by Iraq to Britain was "genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them [the United Kingdoms] were justified by the information available at the time. (Paragraph 41)"
In other words, relying on the U.S. for intelligence information, to the degree that Britain did, was seen as faulty, but the perception of threat was genuine.
This despite the fact that a March 2002 British intelligence report on wmd's in Iraq basically downplayed the threat. This despite the fact of pre-9/11 conclusions reached in this country by the CIA. When the CIA adruptly changed its intelligence reports on Iraq after 9/11, to claim the presence of vast Iraqian stockpiles of chemican and biological weapons, wouldn't the British be just a little skeptical?
And if British officials weren't skeptical, committee members want to know why, given that it is likely that British officials were made aware of the CIA report from March 2002, declaring the Niger document to be forged. According to the committee, the report was "squelched", and the committee, in today's report wants to know why and how this report was squelched.
In light of available intelligence, it is difficult to swallow the belief that officials in Britain "genuinely" believed in a threat, just as it is difficult to believe American officials believed in an immanent threat. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that officials genuinely believed in the need to convince the British public of a threat. Wether the threat was real or not was at question then, as it is now.
It doesn't help that one of the architects of this preemptive policy, Wolfowitz, admitted wmd's were basically an excuse for going to war. Hard to believe the British weren't aware of this "excuse". Why, you'd have to believe that Blair is the willing dupe of the U.S., instead of a collaborator.
It is difficult to believe that Vice-President Cheney and intelligence on this side of the Atlantic failed to inform the British of Joseph Wilson's report on the Niger/Iraq connection. The question remains, why did Bush and Blair choose to rely on that report, despite evidence to the contrary. The committee in its report is asking for intelligence data as to when British intelligence was informed of the forged Niger documents by the CIA.
The report, while clearing Alastair Cambell of "sexing the dossier", has not cleared the government of emphasizing the 45 minute claim of readiness of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons, and wants to know why the claim was included in the dossier, given that it was from a single uncorroborated source.
An article in the guardian.co.uk, in which experts in weapons assessments were gathered from both sides of the Atlantic, says UN weapons inspectors had inspected the supposed sites of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq, and nothing was turned up.
Bottom line conclusion of the report: the Ministers did not mislead Parliament.
This conclusion has been made despite the second dossier being plagiarized and a sham, despite the use of forged documents in the first dossier, despite the 2002 intelligence report to the contrary of the september dossier, despite the continued findings of the UN inspectors that failed to corroborate a single belief in the existence of weapons of mass destruction.
One can only conclude that conclusions reached in this report are politically motivated. Yet the report leaves many unanswered questions, leading one to wonder how such a conclusion could be reached. How long will the British public put up with denial and deception?
Parliament is asking for answers now:
The intelligence and security committee is to investigate whether Downing Street spun or distorted intelligence from MI6 to drum up public and parliamentary support for the war against Iraq.
This investigation could not occur a moment too soon, yet one would hope the investigation would be thorough and take as much time as needed. The health of our republics is all that is at stake.
For example, the committee concluded that Britain relied too heavily on U.S. intelligence, including that of exiles and defectors with an "agenda of their own". Yet it is also concluded that the perception of the threat posed by Iraq to Britain was "genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them [the United Kingdoms] were justified by the information available at the time. (Paragraph 41)"
In other words, relying on the U.S. for intelligence information, to the degree that Britain did, was seen as faulty, but the perception of threat was genuine.
This despite the fact that a March 2002 British intelligence report on wmd's in Iraq basically downplayed the threat. This despite the fact of pre-9/11 conclusions reached in this country by the CIA. When the CIA adruptly changed its intelligence reports on Iraq after 9/11, to claim the presence of vast Iraqian stockpiles of chemican and biological weapons, wouldn't the British be just a little skeptical?
And if British officials weren't skeptical, committee members want to know why, given that it is likely that British officials were made aware of the CIA report from March 2002, declaring the Niger document to be forged. According to the committee, the report was "squelched", and the committee, in today's report wants to know why and how this report was squelched.
In light of available intelligence, it is difficult to swallow the belief that officials in Britain "genuinely" believed in a threat, just as it is difficult to believe American officials believed in an immanent threat. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that officials genuinely believed in the need to convince the British public of a threat. Wether the threat was real or not was at question then, as it is now.
It doesn't help that one of the architects of this preemptive policy, Wolfowitz, admitted wmd's were basically an excuse for going to war. Hard to believe the British weren't aware of this "excuse". Why, you'd have to believe that Blair is the willing dupe of the U.S., instead of a collaborator.
It is difficult to believe that Vice-President Cheney and intelligence on this side of the Atlantic failed to inform the British of Joseph Wilson's report on the Niger/Iraq connection. The question remains, why did Bush and Blair choose to rely on that report, despite evidence to the contrary. The committee in its report is asking for intelligence data as to when British intelligence was informed of the forged Niger documents by the CIA.
The report, while clearing Alastair Cambell of "sexing the dossier", has not cleared the government of emphasizing the 45 minute claim of readiness of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons, and wants to know why the claim was included in the dossier, given that it was from a single uncorroborated source.
An article in the guardian.co.uk, in which experts in weapons assessments were gathered from both sides of the Atlantic, says UN weapons inspectors had inspected the supposed sites of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq, and nothing was turned up.
Bottom line conclusion of the report: the Ministers did not mislead Parliament.
This conclusion has been made despite the second dossier being plagiarized and a sham, despite the use of forged documents in the first dossier, despite the 2002 intelligence report to the contrary of the september dossier, despite the continued findings of the UN inspectors that failed to corroborate a single belief in the existence of weapons of mass destruction.
One can only conclude that conclusions reached in this report are politically motivated. Yet the report leaves many unanswered questions, leading one to wonder how such a conclusion could be reached. How long will the British public put up with denial and deception?
Parliament is asking for answers now:
The intelligence and security committee is to investigate whether Downing Street spun or distorted intelligence from MI6 to drum up public and parliamentary support for the war against Iraq.
This investigation could not occur a moment too soon, yet one would hope the investigation would be thorough and take as much time as needed. The health of our republics is all that is at stake.
# posted by scorpiorising : 6:51 AM |
Sunday, July 06, 2003
In this comment by political journalist Andrew Rawnsley in the guardian.co.uk, he suggests that we should not have high expectations of the report that is to be issued tomorrow by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee:
The title of the committee's inquiry - 'The Decision To Go To War In Iraq' - suggests a scope which is sweeping. The actual product will be narrow. It rushed at the job, taking just six days of evidence. It focused its inquiries on one aspect of one area - the '45-minute' claim - to the exclusion of many other vital topics.
Here are some of the large questions about the war that the committee cannot answer because it did not make a start on asking the questions. Exactly when did Tony Blair promise George Bush that he would commit British forces to the war? Why did British diplomacy fail to secure the second resolution at the United Nations which the Prime Minister had previously staked so much on? Was the Cabinet fully informed and consulted at all times? Were the intelligence assessments of Saddam Hussein's arsenal wrong? Why did the Prime Minister choose to believe the most frightening warnings? Why was there such scant preparation for handling the post-war situation in Iraq? Tony Blair's revelation, made to our political editor in today's The Observer , that he expected the war to last 125 days is more illuminating than any new fact established by the committee.
The title of the committee's inquiry - 'The Decision To Go To War In Iraq' - suggests a scope which is sweeping. The actual product will be narrow. It rushed at the job, taking just six days of evidence. It focused its inquiries on one aspect of one area - the '45-minute' claim - to the exclusion of many other vital topics.
Here are some of the large questions about the war that the committee cannot answer because it did not make a start on asking the questions. Exactly when did Tony Blair promise George Bush that he would commit British forces to the war? Why did British diplomacy fail to secure the second resolution at the United Nations which the Prime Minister had previously staked so much on? Was the Cabinet fully informed and consulted at all times? Were the intelligence assessments of Saddam Hussein's arsenal wrong? Why did the Prime Minister choose to believe the most frightening warnings? Why was there such scant preparation for handling the post-war situation in Iraq? Tony Blair's revelation, made to our political editor in today's The Observer , that he expected the war to last 125 days is more illuminating than any new fact established by the committee.
# posted by scorpiorising : 5:38 PM |
This article in today's Sunday Herald shows a BBC that is not cowed:
The BBC has issued a stark warning to Alastair Campbell that it will sue him if he repeats his allegations that its journalist Andrew Gilligan lied over claims that Downing Street “sexed up” a dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons.
In a defiant signal that the corporation will not be cowed, intimidated or bullied by Number 10 in its increasingly bitter war of words over the Iraq war, the BBC has also authorised its defence correspondent to threaten legal action against a Labour MP who claims that he misled a Commons inquiry.
In a separate development, a senior intelligence officer, who previously briefed the Sunday Herald that the government had misled the public and parliament, last night strongly rebutted Campbell’s denial that he spun the case for war.
“I previously said that there was absolute scepticism among British intelligence over the case for the invasion of Iraq. That is still the case. Campbell’s claims that the dossier wasn’t sexed up are utter rubbish.”
Andrew Gilligan, the BBC journalist who reported that Campbell had “sexed up” a 45-minute attack warning on weapons of mass destruction, is set to sue Labour MP Phil Woolas over claims he misled a Commons committee.
The move has the full backing of the BBC Director General Greg Dyke, who came to the barricades with his senior managers to defend the corporation’s reputation over the accusations.
“Basically, we’re pretty fed up with this bullying and we want to put a stop to it,” said a senior BBC insider. “We’re fed up of the intimidation and we will sue if Woolas doesn’t retract.
“If we could sue Campbell we would too, but he has been careful to make his statements under privilege while giving evidence to the foreign affairs committee.”
There was also a story in the Sunday Herald today that focused on the methods and tactics of Alastair Campbell as he attempts to spin himself and Tony Blair out of trouble:
It takes one to know one, you might think, but Sir Bernard has some evidence to back his claims. Campbell's appearance on Channel 4 News was an extraordinary piece of television, eclipsing in 10 minutes anything you might wait three weeks to see on Big Brother .
He turned up unannounced at the studios on Gray's Inn Road, London, apparently having made a decision that he, the master of the broadcasting universe, would now talk to the nation. For all the warning anchorman Jon Snow was given, it might well have been Elvis at the door. 'Alastair Campbell is in the building' was what the presenter was told in his earpiece two minutes before the interview -- if it can be described as that -- began. What followed was an incredible gladiatorial clash, with Campbell jabbing his finger and questioning every assertion Snow made. It was a political interview -- but Campbell is not a politician, so he can step outside the conventions of calm politeness that stifle so many television encounters with ministers and MPs. And he did so in spades. The windmilling arm movements which he has taught others not to use; the repeated stretching for a drink of water during questioning; the camera cutting back to capture him with a glass in one hand, pen pointing at the interviewer with the other. The overall effect was of a pub boor -- ironic given that Campbell has famously forsworn alcohol after it nearly destroyed his life.
To those familiar with him, it was a typical Campbell performance. He is belligerent, he argues aggressively, he is passionately loyal to Tony Blair and he will fight tooth and nail to preserve his own reputation and that of the Prime Minister. Yet in the battle for the truth over the reasons for going to war with Iraq, Campbell has been branded a liar. Completely frustrated that he has been rendered unbelievable in the eyes of the public, he has started a street brawl between the government and the BBC, the guardian of the nation's political morals. It is hard ground on which to choose to fight -- the master of spin accusing one of the most trusted institutions in Britain of 'weasel words and sophistry'. The BBC, in turn, has accused the government of attempting to intimidate its journalists in the run-up to and during the Iraq war. This is not just a spat. It is a series of serious hostile exchanges between two of Britain's most important and powerful institutions.
People might debate whether Campbell is mad, but they certainly have to credit him with genius. His appearance on Channel 4 meant the heat was on him and off Blair; it also ensured that for another 48 hours the news focus would remain sharply on the war. Not, that is, the real war -- the dirty one in the desert where British military policemen are executed in gangland-style killings and where weapons of mass destruction remain hidden in the shifting sands of claim and counter-claim. Not that war, but the war of words between the government and the BBC that Campbell engineered earlier in the week.
The BBC has issued a stark warning to Alastair Campbell that it will sue him if he repeats his allegations that its journalist Andrew Gilligan lied over claims that Downing Street “sexed up” a dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons.
In a defiant signal that the corporation will not be cowed, intimidated or bullied by Number 10 in its increasingly bitter war of words over the Iraq war, the BBC has also authorised its defence correspondent to threaten legal action against a Labour MP who claims that he misled a Commons inquiry.
In a separate development, a senior intelligence officer, who previously briefed the Sunday Herald that the government had misled the public and parliament, last night strongly rebutted Campbell’s denial that he spun the case for war.
“I previously said that there was absolute scepticism among British intelligence over the case for the invasion of Iraq. That is still the case. Campbell’s claims that the dossier wasn’t sexed up are utter rubbish.”
Andrew Gilligan, the BBC journalist who reported that Campbell had “sexed up” a 45-minute attack warning on weapons of mass destruction, is set to sue Labour MP Phil Woolas over claims he misled a Commons committee.
The move has the full backing of the BBC Director General Greg Dyke, who came to the barricades with his senior managers to defend the corporation’s reputation over the accusations.
“Basically, we’re pretty fed up with this bullying and we want to put a stop to it,” said a senior BBC insider. “We’re fed up of the intimidation and we will sue if Woolas doesn’t retract.
“If we could sue Campbell we would too, but he has been careful to make his statements under privilege while giving evidence to the foreign affairs committee.”
There was also a story in the Sunday Herald today that focused on the methods and tactics of Alastair Campbell as he attempts to spin himself and Tony Blair out of trouble:
It takes one to know one, you might think, but Sir Bernard has some evidence to back his claims. Campbell's appearance on Channel 4 News was an extraordinary piece of television, eclipsing in 10 minutes anything you might wait three weeks to see on Big Brother .
He turned up unannounced at the studios on Gray's Inn Road, London, apparently having made a decision that he, the master of the broadcasting universe, would now talk to the nation. For all the warning anchorman Jon Snow was given, it might well have been Elvis at the door. 'Alastair Campbell is in the building' was what the presenter was told in his earpiece two minutes before the interview -- if it can be described as that -- began. What followed was an incredible gladiatorial clash, with Campbell jabbing his finger and questioning every assertion Snow made. It was a political interview -- but Campbell is not a politician, so he can step outside the conventions of calm politeness that stifle so many television encounters with ministers and MPs. And he did so in spades. The windmilling arm movements which he has taught others not to use; the repeated stretching for a drink of water during questioning; the camera cutting back to capture him with a glass in one hand, pen pointing at the interviewer with the other. The overall effect was of a pub boor -- ironic given that Campbell has famously forsworn alcohol after it nearly destroyed his life.
To those familiar with him, it was a typical Campbell performance. He is belligerent, he argues aggressively, he is passionately loyal to Tony Blair and he will fight tooth and nail to preserve his own reputation and that of the Prime Minister. Yet in the battle for the truth over the reasons for going to war with Iraq, Campbell has been branded a liar. Completely frustrated that he has been rendered unbelievable in the eyes of the public, he has started a street brawl between the government and the BBC, the guardian of the nation's political morals. It is hard ground on which to choose to fight -- the master of spin accusing one of the most trusted institutions in Britain of 'weasel words and sophistry'. The BBC, in turn, has accused the government of attempting to intimidate its journalists in the run-up to and during the Iraq war. This is not just a spat. It is a series of serious hostile exchanges between two of Britain's most important and powerful institutions.
People might debate whether Campbell is mad, but they certainly have to credit him with genius. His appearance on Channel 4 meant the heat was on him and off Blair; it also ensured that for another 48 hours the news focus would remain sharply on the war. Not, that is, the real war -- the dirty one in the desert where British military policemen are executed in gangland-style killings and where weapons of mass destruction remain hidden in the shifting sands of claim and counter-claim. Not that war, but the war of words between the government and the BBC that Campbell engineered earlier in the week.
# posted by scorpiorising : 5:31 PM |
The British goverment is playing musical dossiers, hoping that by admitting mistakes in the second dossiers, this will deflect concerns on the first dossier:
The British Government is to express regret about fundamental flaws in the second dossier it released on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction to justify war.
Whitehall sources said officials would tell a parliamentary inquiry into the issue that the second dossier on Saddam's history of deception undermined public trust in government information.
If the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is questioned on the issue, he will concede that mistakes were made.
Government officials now admit that the second dossier, which was largely culled from a 13-year-old thesis by a Californian PhD student, is damaging the British case for war against Iraq.
The dossier was published last February to coincide with Mr Blair's war summit with President George Bush in Washington. A week later it was revealed to be a mish-mash of intelligence reports, student work and publicly available briefings by Jane's Intelligence Review. The sources were not acknowledged, leaving the impression that it was all based on fresh intelligence.
Officials hope that admitting errors over the second dossier will strengthen their case on the first dossier, published last September, which has been the subject of allegations that it was "sexed up" to make a stronger case for war.
Is this the British goverment rationalizing that by admitting mistakes regarding the second dossier, this may deflect concern regarding the first dossier? How in the world will a flawed second dossier, not lead to questions regarding the first dossier?
The British goverment might as well admit the fox is in the hen house, and it is only a matter of time before the crumbling cases of intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic point to Bush and Blair.
Speaking of foxes in the hen house, consider that the Australian government has dirtied itself by its involvement in this war:
One of the Prime Minister's justifications for war on Iraq was declared unreliable in a United States State Department alert to the Australian Government several months before.
According to a former senior State Department official, CIA claims that the Iraqi regime had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program were strongly challenged by the State Department and the US Department of Energy, and this was made known to the Australian Government.
The assertion by Greg Theilmann came as the US Government was accused of ignoring a report which rejected claims that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger, a premise the President, George Bush, used to invade Iraq.
A former US ambassador, Joseph Wilson, said the claims of attempted purchases about three years ago were used by Mr Bush and officials to support their assertions that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program.
"It really comes down to the Administration misrepresenting the facts on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war," Mr Wilson told The Washington Post. "It begs the question, what else are they lying about?"
Mr Theilmann, who between 2000 and 2002 analysed all the US intelligence on Iraq and its nuclear ambitions, said these dissenting views would not have been a secret to the Howard Government.
"If the Prime Minister was reaching the conclusion that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, which in our office was one of the biggest issues of all, well, we saw no evidence."
Australian and US intelligence officials say analysis from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is passed to Australia through the Office of National Assessments, which assesses intelligence and reports to the Prime Minister.
On February 4, Mr Howard told Parliament that a CIA analysis said Iraq "is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program". He also cited British intelligence that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa and "continues to work on developing nuclear weapons".
Mr Theilmann told the Herald that intelligence material claiming that Iraq was buying aluminium tubes allegedly designedto reprocess uranium using a gas-centrifuge method was rejected.
"We did not buy the CIA interpretation," he said. "We agreed with the Department of Energy, who were the US experts on centrifuge technology, who said that this was not for the nuclear weapons program."
Mr Theilmann's office had also investigated the Niger claims and rejected them in mid-2002. He had been shocked to hear Mr Bush on January 28 citing British intelligence reports claiming that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from an African country.
Based on the content of Mr. Howard's speech cited in the above article, On Feb. 4, is it apparent then that Mr. Howard lied to the parliament, and the Australian people?
The British Government is to express regret about fundamental flaws in the second dossier it released on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction to justify war.
Whitehall sources said officials would tell a parliamentary inquiry into the issue that the second dossier on Saddam's history of deception undermined public trust in government information.
If the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is questioned on the issue, he will concede that mistakes were made.
Government officials now admit that the second dossier, which was largely culled from a 13-year-old thesis by a Californian PhD student, is damaging the British case for war against Iraq.
The dossier was published last February to coincide with Mr Blair's war summit with President George Bush in Washington. A week later it was revealed to be a mish-mash of intelligence reports, student work and publicly available briefings by Jane's Intelligence Review. The sources were not acknowledged, leaving the impression that it was all based on fresh intelligence.
Officials hope that admitting errors over the second dossier will strengthen their case on the first dossier, published last September, which has been the subject of allegations that it was "sexed up" to make a stronger case for war.
Is this the British goverment rationalizing that by admitting mistakes regarding the second dossier, this may deflect concern regarding the first dossier? How in the world will a flawed second dossier, not lead to questions regarding the first dossier?
The British goverment might as well admit the fox is in the hen house, and it is only a matter of time before the crumbling cases of intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic point to Bush and Blair.
Speaking of foxes in the hen house, consider that the Australian government has dirtied itself by its involvement in this war:
One of the Prime Minister's justifications for war on Iraq was declared unreliable in a United States State Department alert to the Australian Government several months before.
According to a former senior State Department official, CIA claims that the Iraqi regime had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program were strongly challenged by the State Department and the US Department of Energy, and this was made known to the Australian Government.
The assertion by Greg Theilmann came as the US Government was accused of ignoring a report which rejected claims that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger, a premise the President, George Bush, used to invade Iraq.
A former US ambassador, Joseph Wilson, said the claims of attempted purchases about three years ago were used by Mr Bush and officials to support their assertions that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program.
"It really comes down to the Administration misrepresenting the facts on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war," Mr Wilson told The Washington Post. "It begs the question, what else are they lying about?"
Mr Theilmann, who between 2000 and 2002 analysed all the US intelligence on Iraq and its nuclear ambitions, said these dissenting views would not have been a secret to the Howard Government.
"If the Prime Minister was reaching the conclusion that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, which in our office was one of the biggest issues of all, well, we saw no evidence."
Australian and US intelligence officials say analysis from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is passed to Australia through the Office of National Assessments, which assesses intelligence and reports to the Prime Minister.
On February 4, Mr Howard told Parliament that a CIA analysis said Iraq "is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program". He also cited British intelligence that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa and "continues to work on developing nuclear weapons".
Mr Theilmann told the Herald that intelligence material claiming that Iraq was buying aluminium tubes allegedly designedto reprocess uranium using a gas-centrifuge method was rejected.
"We did not buy the CIA interpretation," he said. "We agreed with the Department of Energy, who were the US experts on centrifuge technology, who said that this was not for the nuclear weapons program."
Mr Theilmann's office had also investigated the Niger claims and rejected them in mid-2002. He had been shocked to hear Mr Bush on January 28 citing British intelligence reports claiming that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from an African country.
Based on the content of Mr. Howard's speech cited in the above article, On Feb. 4, is it apparent then that Mr. Howard lied to the parliament, and the Australian people?
# posted by scorpiorising : 10:21 AM |
When I see stories like this:
At the cemetery on the edge of the town, where Fallujah dissipates into desert, 11 small mounds of earth have been dug, awaiting proper headstones. The children have been buried together rather than in family plots. Saad Ibrahim whose father, Hussein, was killed in the corner shop he kept, has a few caustic questions for the tank-buster's pilot: 'I want to ask him: what exactly did you see that day that you had to kill my father and those kids? Do you have good eyesight? Is your computer working well? If not... well, that's your business. But there was no military activity in this area. There was no shooting. This is not a military camp. These are houses with children playing in the street.'
...and stories like this:
'The lights were on inside the bus,' remembers Sajed, 'and there was some shouting, American shouting. There was silence for a while, then a noise which made me think I would go deaf. The bus jumped like an animal being killed. Next day, the Americans came and buried the bodies of all the people, and the morning after that they came back and burned the bus.'
Rahad Klader, 30, who saw the incident from his window, recounts that after the tank had fired and the bus exploded, the Americans came up to the vehicle and emptied their machine-guns into whoever had survived. Ammunition strewn around the wreck is, indeed, American - not Iraqi, which would have given the tank some reason to suspect military activity aboard the bus.
...from the guardian.co.uk today, stories of horror generated by this war, the question of why we went into this war, becomes that much more important.
At the cemetery on the edge of the town, where Fallujah dissipates into desert, 11 small mounds of earth have been dug, awaiting proper headstones. The children have been buried together rather than in family plots. Saad Ibrahim whose father, Hussein, was killed in the corner shop he kept, has a few caustic questions for the tank-buster's pilot: 'I want to ask him: what exactly did you see that day that you had to kill my father and those kids? Do you have good eyesight? Is your computer working well? If not... well, that's your business. But there was no military activity in this area. There was no shooting. This is not a military camp. These are houses with children playing in the street.'
...and stories like this:
'The lights were on inside the bus,' remembers Sajed, 'and there was some shouting, American shouting. There was silence for a while, then a noise which made me think I would go deaf. The bus jumped like an animal being killed. Next day, the Americans came and buried the bodies of all the people, and the morning after that they came back and burned the bus.'
Rahad Klader, 30, who saw the incident from his window, recounts that after the tank had fired and the bus exploded, the Americans came up to the vehicle and emptied their machine-guns into whoever had survived. Ammunition strewn around the wreck is, indeed, American - not Iraqi, which would have given the tank some reason to suspect military activity aboard the bus.
...from the guardian.co.uk today, stories of horror generated by this war, the question of why we went into this war, becomes that much more important.
# posted by scorpiorising : 9:27 AM |
BBC goes on the offensive.
This article from the guardian.co.uk today, has the BBC on the offensive again:
The head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, secretly briefed senior BBC executives on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction before the Today programme claimed Number 10 had 'sexed up' part of the evidence.
In a remarkable revelation that goes to the heart of the increasingly bitter row between the Government and the BBC, broadcasting sources have told The Observer that Dearlove suggested that Syria and Iran posed a greater threat to world security than Iraq.
Although the MI6 chief was not the source of BBC allegations that 10 Downing Street deliberately exaggerated the claim that Saddam's weapons could be ready in 45 minutes, the meetings have strengthened resolve within the corporation to refuse Government demands that it should apologise.
Greg Dyke, the Director General of the BBC, will give a robust defence of the story and say that many of the allegations have been proved true.
This move will put him in direct conflict with Tony Blair, who dramatically upped the stakes last night by demanding a full retraction of the allegations about weapons of mass destruction, saying the charge against him was the gravest he had ever faced as Prime Minister.
And Prime Minister Tony Blair continues to blow steam:
'There couldn't be a more serious charge, that I ordered our troops into conflict on the basis of intelligence evidence that I falsified.
'You could not make a more serious charge against a Prime Minister. The charge happens to be wrong. I think everyone now accepts that that charge is wrong.'
But last night the BBC was still sticking by its story. Senior figures told The Observer they had a 'powerful case' for the governors.
Blair said: 'I am astonished if they are still saying it is accurate. On what basis are they saying that?'
'Whether they had a source or not, only they know. The issue surely is this, that if people make a claim and it turns out to be wrong, they should accept it is wrong.
'I take it as about as serious an attack on my integrity there could possibly be, and the charge is untrue and I hope that they will accept that. I think they should accept it.
I wonder if he has read the op-ed piece by Joseph Wilson in the New York Times today:
Did the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq?
Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.
For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and S?o Tomé and Pr?ncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.
It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.
There appears to be enough evidence on both sides of the Atlantic to justify the claim that intelligence was exaggerated, and even falsified, to lead us into war with Iraq.
The head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, secretly briefed senior BBC executives on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction before the Today programme claimed Number 10 had 'sexed up' part of the evidence.
In a remarkable revelation that goes to the heart of the increasingly bitter row between the Government and the BBC, broadcasting sources have told The Observer that Dearlove suggested that Syria and Iran posed a greater threat to world security than Iraq.
Although the MI6 chief was not the source of BBC allegations that 10 Downing Street deliberately exaggerated the claim that Saddam's weapons could be ready in 45 minutes, the meetings have strengthened resolve within the corporation to refuse Government demands that it should apologise.
Greg Dyke, the Director General of the BBC, will give a robust defence of the story and say that many of the allegations have been proved true.
This move will put him in direct conflict with Tony Blair, who dramatically upped the stakes last night by demanding a full retraction of the allegations about weapons of mass destruction, saying the charge against him was the gravest he had ever faced as Prime Minister.
And Prime Minister Tony Blair continues to blow steam:
'There couldn't be a more serious charge, that I ordered our troops into conflict on the basis of intelligence evidence that I falsified.
'You could not make a more serious charge against a Prime Minister. The charge happens to be wrong. I think everyone now accepts that that charge is wrong.'
But last night the BBC was still sticking by its story. Senior figures told The Observer they had a 'powerful case' for the governors.
Blair said: 'I am astonished if they are still saying it is accurate. On what basis are they saying that?'
'Whether they had a source or not, only they know. The issue surely is this, that if people make a claim and it turns out to be wrong, they should accept it is wrong.
'I take it as about as serious an attack on my integrity there could possibly be, and the charge is untrue and I hope that they will accept that. I think they should accept it.
I wonder if he has read the op-ed piece by Joseph Wilson in the New York Times today:
Did the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq?
Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.
For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and S?o Tomé and Pr?ncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.
It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.
There appears to be enough evidence on both sides of the Atlantic to justify the claim that intelligence was exaggerated, and even falsified, to lead us into war with Iraq.
# posted by scorpiorising : 9:02 AM |
Crisis in Britain, Crisis in America
While the Brits argue over who sexed the dossier, if anyone, the evidence continues to mount over the claim that intelligence used to justify this war was either exaggerated or falsified.
In the New York Times today, in an op-ed piece, a career foreign service officer and ambassador, Joseph C. Wilson, reveals that he is the unnamed envoy who went to Niger to try to determine if Niger's link to the Iraqi nuclear program actually existed:
It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.
In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake — a form of lightly processed ore — by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990's. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office.
Wilson's revelations concerning this supposed Iraq/Niger connection could not be more damning to the credability of the Bush push to war:
I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.
Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.
What's more, Wilson states there should be at least four documents detailing his verbal reports to the CIA and State Department:
Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.
Though I did not file a written report, there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure.
His conclusions were not or should not have been a secret to the members of the Bush administration and to Bush himself. Wilson points out the allegations concerning an African country and Iraq's nuclear program resurfaced in a British intelligence dossier in September, 2002:
I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.
Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.
Wison said he reminded the State Department of his trip to Niger, and conclusions, but was told that the president, in his speech in January, was referring to "other African nations". Wilson, at that time, remained trusting of the administration's intentions:
I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case.
Wilson expresses concern as to why his conclusions concerning Niger and Iraq were apparently discarded, and the original information that Wilson was supposed to have personally investigated and proven false, were used as justification for this war:
The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted.
The question, my dear Brits, ought not to be "was the dossier sexed up", but rather, how many players, in this tragic and faltering policy for war in Iraq, participated in the "sexing up of the dossier", in order to lead Americans and Brits into a quagmire of a mess for which we see no end in sight.
Did Alastair Campbell participate in the manipulation of intelligence in order to convince the Brits of the need for war? If he did not, then he was mislead, and the question ought to be, who did the misleading?
Tony Blair with his attack dogs, of which Alastair Campbell is one of them, has a venerated institution of journalism, the BBC, reeling back on its heels. In a letter to the BBC on June 26, Campbell asks:
Was the source, as Gilligan has said, a "senior official involved in drawing up the dossier", or is he, as you said today, a source "in the intelligence services"? I'm sure you at least understand the significance of the difference to which I am alluding.
One thing needs to be said. The checks and balances in place to filter out false intelligence, disproved intelligence, unreliable intelligence, failed in high levels of the British and American governments. Where and how they failed is beginning to come to light, via courageous, honest people like Joseph Wilson, who are concerned about the state of our republics, as they should be.
On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, there are many alluding to the players and the causes of this intelligence failure. No amount of posturing by Alastair Campbell or Tony Blair, no amount of huffing and puffing and I'm going to blow your house down bravado, will change the conclusions that are beginning to surface.
We were misled.
I call on the BBC to continue its investigations into these questions. I call on the American media to investigate these questions. There is no reason for any member of the media to be on the defensive in these times. Throw it back at them. If Alastair Campbell didn't sex up the dossier, who did? And how is it that Mr. Campbell did not know of Joseph Wilson's report on the falsity of the Niger/Iraq connection. These are the questions that ought to be asked, and it will send Blair and Bush and their attack dogs reeling back on their heels.
Did Vice-President Cheney know the Niger/Iraq connection had been proven false by the envoy sent to check out the assertions? How could he not know?. And if he knew, how could the President of the United States not know?
In the New York Times today, in an op-ed piece, a career foreign service officer and ambassador, Joseph C. Wilson, reveals that he is the unnamed envoy who went to Niger to try to determine if Niger's link to the Iraqi nuclear program actually existed:
It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.
In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake — a form of lightly processed ore — by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990's. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office.
Wilson's revelations concerning this supposed Iraq/Niger connection could not be more damning to the credability of the Bush push to war:
I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.
Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.
What's more, Wilson states there should be at least four documents detailing his verbal reports to the CIA and State Department:
Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.
Though I did not file a written report, there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure.
His conclusions were not or should not have been a secret to the members of the Bush administration and to Bush himself. Wilson points out the allegations concerning an African country and Iraq's nuclear program resurfaced in a British intelligence dossier in September, 2002:
I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.
Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.
Wison said he reminded the State Department of his trip to Niger, and conclusions, but was told that the president, in his speech in January, was referring to "other African nations". Wilson, at that time, remained trusting of the administration's intentions:
I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case.
Wilson expresses concern as to why his conclusions concerning Niger and Iraq were apparently discarded, and the original information that Wilson was supposed to have personally investigated and proven false, were used as justification for this war:
The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted.
The question, my dear Brits, ought not to be "was the dossier sexed up", but rather, how many players, in this tragic and faltering policy for war in Iraq, participated in the "sexing up of the dossier", in order to lead Americans and Brits into a quagmire of a mess for which we see no end in sight.
Did Alastair Campbell participate in the manipulation of intelligence in order to convince the Brits of the need for war? If he did not, then he was mislead, and the question ought to be, who did the misleading?
Tony Blair with his attack dogs, of which Alastair Campbell is one of them, has a venerated institution of journalism, the BBC, reeling back on its heels. In a letter to the BBC on June 26, Campbell asks:
Was the source, as Gilligan has said, a "senior official involved in drawing up the dossier", or is he, as you said today, a source "in the intelligence services"? I'm sure you at least understand the significance of the difference to which I am alluding.
One thing needs to be said. The checks and balances in place to filter out false intelligence, disproved intelligence, unreliable intelligence, failed in high levels of the British and American governments. Where and how they failed is beginning to come to light, via courageous, honest people like Joseph Wilson, who are concerned about the state of our republics, as they should be.
On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, there are many alluding to the players and the causes of this intelligence failure. No amount of posturing by Alastair Campbell or Tony Blair, no amount of huffing and puffing and I'm going to blow your house down bravado, will change the conclusions that are beginning to surface.
We were misled.
I call on the BBC to continue its investigations into these questions. I call on the American media to investigate these questions. There is no reason for any member of the media to be on the defensive in these times. Throw it back at them. If Alastair Campbell didn't sex up the dossier, who did? And how is it that Mr. Campbell did not know of Joseph Wilson's report on the falsity of the Niger/Iraq connection. These are the questions that ought to be asked, and it will send Blair and Bush and their attack dogs reeling back on their heels.
Did Vice-President Cheney know the Niger/Iraq connection had been proven false by the envoy sent to check out the assertions? How could he not know?. And if he knew, how could the President of the United States not know?
# posted by scorpiorising : 6:26 AM |
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